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Introduction

Wealth levels have been shown to vary considerably over the life cycle and across the population of workers on the verge of retirement.1 There is also much dispersion in observed levels
of consumer financial sophistication,2 and this heterogeneity in financial literacy is positively
associated with retirement wealth.3 Accordingly, analysts and policymakers interested in retirement system reforms seek to understand what drives these correlations, particularly in
an environment where consumers are increasingly required to save for their own retirement.4
A handful of prior studies suggests that financial literacy itself is an endogenous variable
and that individuals can increase their human capital by investing in financial literacy.5 Yet
these analyses have not devised an explicit multiperiod theoretical model that can be used to
generate cross-sectional differences in wealth-to-income profiles, which is necessary to assess
which types of consumers would benefit the most by early investment in financial literacy
and sophisticated investment products. The mechanism we propose is that financial literacy
enables individuals to better allocate resources over the life cycle. Accordingly, our model
explores two important questions: 1) What forces shape financial literacy accumulation over
the life cycle?, and 2) How much of the life cycle and cross-sectional variation in wealth might
be attributable to differences in financial literacy?
Extending the life cycle model to include financial literacy is useful and indeed imperative
for three reasons. First, many consumers appear not to “know” as much as economists often
assume in theoretical models.6 Accordingly, specifying how literacy is acquired in a life cycle
setting should be of keen interest to those seeking to explain wealth dispersion. Second,
existing economic models of saving often have a difficult time explaining several stylized
facts without appealing to exogenous preference differences or heterogeneity in large fixed
See Venti and Wise (2000) and Moore and Mitchell (2000).
See Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b, 2009) and Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2010).
3
See Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a); Behrman, Mitchell, Soo and Bravo (2011); and Van Rooij, Lusardi
and Alessie (2011).
4
See for instance Poterba, Venti and Wise (2009).
5
See for instance Delavande, Rohwedder, and Willis (2009) and Jappelli and Padula (2011).
6
For data on this point see Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2011) and Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2010).
1
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costs for investing in financial products.7 For this reason, economists have not been able to
readily explain why a significant fraction of the population reaches retirement with little or no
wealth, without assuming either that some subset of consumers is extremely impatient, that
they face high replacement rates from government programs and pensions, and other reasons.
In this vein, Venti and Wise (2000) show that permanent income differences and chance alone
can explain only 30-40% of observed differences in retirement wealth, implying that other
factors should be taken into account. Third, those seeking to replicate observed heterogeneity
in wealth across education and permanent income groups have invoked a range of factors
including means-testing programs (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994) and impatience in
the form of hyperbolic discounting (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg,
2001). Still others assume that consumers use rule-of-thumb in saving decisions (Campbell
and Mankiw, 1989). In contrast, our analysis builds on Yitzhaki’s (1987) work showing
that expected returns from financial products differ accross income groups. Accordingly,
this paper asks how such differences in returns can arise from endogeneous accumulation of
financial literacy.
In what follows, we build and calibrate a stochastic life cycle utility maximization model
featuring uncertainty in income, capital market returns, and medical expenditures, and we
include an endogenous literacy accumulation process and a sophisticated saving technology.
In the model, financial literacy allows consumers to potentially raise the rate of return
earned on financial assets, and it also permits them to use more sophisticated financial
products. Individuals who wish to transfer resources over time by saving will benefit the most
from financial literacy. Moreover, because of how the U.S. social insurance system works,
more educated individuals have the most to gain from investing in financial literacy. As a
result, allowing for endogenous financial literacy accumulation allows for an amplification of
differences in accumulated retirement wealth. Thus our approach departs from traditional
saving/consumption models8 in that it allows for a choice of a saving technology with returns
and costs that depend on each consumer’s level of financial literacy. The fact that returns
7
8

See Cagetti (2003) and Huang and Caliendo (2009).
See Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Cagetti (2003); and Sholz, Seshadri and Khitrakun (2006).
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depend on the consumer’s level of financial literacy can also be viewed as an extension of
models in the portfolio choice literature (e.g. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005) where
returns are exogeneous and the consumer only decides how much he will invest in risky
assets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes empirical
evidence on the lifecycle path of assets, consumers’ use of financial products, and financial
literacy accumulation by education group. In Section 3, we present our model. Section 4
outlines model calibration, and Section 5 presents our simulation results. A conclusion and
discussion appears in Section 6.

2

Life Cycle Wealth and Financial Literacy

2.1

The Evolution of Income and Assets by Education

The simplest life cycle consumption theory posits that consumers save so as to transfer resources to life stages where the marginal utility of consumption is highest. Given concavity
of the utility function, consumers will seek to transfer resources from periods of their lives
where they earn substantial income, to periods where they earn less. To illustrate typical
household income profiles over the lifecycle, Figure 1 plots median net household income by
education groups, constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).9 These
income paths are estimated separately for workers prior to age 65 and retirees age 65+;
education groups refer to household heads having completed less than a high-school education, high-school graduates, and those with at least some college. We focus on white
males throughout the paper to keep our sample as homogeneous as possible. We also drop
individuals with business assets.10 [Figure 1 here]
Our evidence, consistent with other studies (e.g. Campbell and Viceira, 2002), indicates
that household income for this cohort is hump-shaped over the lifecycle. It also rises at a
These data are extracted for PSID respondents born 1935-1945.
Hurst, Kennickell, Lusardi, and Torralba (2010) show that including those with business assets tends to
skew the interpretation of saving motives for the general population because of the large amount of wealth
they hold and the volatility of their income.
9

10
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faster rate for the college-educated than for the less-educated. All groups’ incomes slowly
decrease from the mid-50’s to retirement. Income falls sharply on retirement, reflecting the
fact that social security and pension benefit amounts are generally lower than labor earnings.
Old-age benefit replacement rates are relatively higher for the less-educated groups, due
to the progressivity of public safety net programs, so better-educated consumers see their
incomes fall relatively more. Thereafter, net household income declines somewhat for all
groups, probably because of changes in household composition (e.g. loss of a spouse).
In Figure 2, we trace life cycle paths of median net worth (bank accounts, stocks, IRAs,
mutual funds, bonds, net real estate, minus debt) for these same individuals.11 For the
typical household, net assets grow steadily up to the mid-60s and then flatten or decline
after that age. Again, there are sharp differences by educational attainment, with the median
college-educated household having more than $335,000 in net financial and housing assets
at age 65. By contrast, the median household with less than a high-school education has
less than $100,000 at the same age.
[Figure 2 here]
In the simplest version of the life cycle model, individuals optimally consume only a
portion of their lifetime incomes each period, borrowing in some periods, and saving in
others. A key prediction from this framework is that the life cycle path of assets normalized
by lifetime income should be the same across groups. As noted by Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1994), the simple life cycle model for higher earners will simply be a scaled-up
version of the lower earners’ profile, so it cannot explain observed wealth heterogeneity.
Another reason that people save is for precautionary reasons: when income is uncertain
and borrowing is difficult, this raises the possibility that a consumer might have a very
high marginal utility of consumption in the future, when income is low. When the utility
function is concave and exhibits prudence (Kimball, 1990), such a consumer will want to
save more in anticipation of this possibility. While precautionary saving can explain some
of the heterogeneity we observe in the data, this still falls short of explaining the many
For a description of PSID wealth measures and a comparison with the Survey of Consumer Finances,
see Juster, Stafford, and Smith (1999).
11
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differences we observe even among those facing similar uncertain incomes.
Still another explanation for why the less-educated fail to save is offered by Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes (1994), who point out that the U.S. social insurance system insures
consumers with limited resources against bad states of the world. That is, means-tested and
redistributive transfer programs such as the Social Security, Medicaid, and Supplemental
Security Income programs provide an explicit consumption floor in the event that households
face poverty in old age. In turn, this consumption floor dampens consumers’ precautionary
saving motives, particularly when they are rather likely to become eligible for such benefits.
Accordingly, this helps explain why the less-educated save little. Yet it does not rationalize
wealth inequality in the upper half of the income distribution, where the consumption floor is
unlikely to be reached. Finally, some authors resort to differences in preferences to explain
differences in wealth accumulation. For example, Cagetti (2003) uses high rates of time
preference and low rates of risk aversion, and he concludes that this combination leads to
low amounts of precautionary wealth among less-educated and young consumers.

2.2

Differentials in Sophisticated Financial Products by Education

In view of the income paths illustrated above, it should be apparent that college-educated
consumers would optimally do relatively more saving (and borrowing), compared to the
less-educated. In turn, this could make the better-educated group more interested than
their less-educated peers in a technology that enhances returns on resources transferred
across periods. Table 1 shows the fraction of PSID respondents which holds stocks, mutual
funds, bonds, or individual retirement accounts (IRAs), arrayed by age and education. We
denote these products as relatively “sophisticated,” as compared to having only a simple
bank account (or no saving at all).
[Table 1 here]
From these data, it is evident that college-educated households are much more likely to
use a sophisticated technology for saving compared to high school dropouts.12 In particular,
12

See Curcuru, Heaton, Lucas and Moore (2005) and Campbell (2006).
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more than 75% of older (age 55-65) college-educated respondents use sophisticated products
compared to fewer than 32% of those with less than a high-school education (of the same
age). The fact that people investing in more complex financial products earn higher returns
relative to a bank account recalls Yitzhaki’s (1987) evidence from tax returns and capital
gains: he showed that households earning higher income also held more sophisticated assets,
which in turn yielded higher returns. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) examine Swedish
data and conclude that expected portfolio returns differed across education groups. Bettereducated investor earned higher market returns fthan the less-educated.
The ability of the highly-educated and higher-paid to enjoy better returns may result
from greater literacy about financial products. Some authors have suggested that limited
numeracy and cognitive ability, or lack of financial sophistication, may explain investment
or participation in the stock market (Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2007; Kimball and
Shumway, 2006; Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011a). By contrast, in what follows we
endogenize the motivation to take up sophisticated financial products as a way to motivate
the emergence and persistence of wealth differences over the lifecycle.

2.3

The Evolution of Financial Literacy by Education

To evaluate household literacy about financial products, we use a rich new dataset: the 2009
US State-by-State National Financial Capability Survey (NFCS).13 In particular, we use five
questions from this Survey (reproduced in the Appendix) evaluating respondents’ knowledge
about interest compounding, risk diversification, inflation, the relationship between bond
prices and interest rates and the relationship between mortage interest rates and payment
horizons. These questions have been shown to been able to characterize financial knowledge
and differentiate among levels of financial sophistication.14
We compute each person’s fraction of correct answers to these five questions, with results
displayed by age and education group in Table 2. Here we see that high-school dropouts
perform much worse than the college-educated. The fact that literacy is initially higher
13
14

For more information about the NFCS, see http://www.usfinancialcapability.org
See Lusardi (2011) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2011).
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for the better-educated may indicate intergenerational transmission of financial literacy,
or it may reveal some direct effect of education on literacy (for example, knowledge of
mathematics and numeracy).15 Between the ages of 20 and 40, the median financial literacy
score rises for all education groups, peaking in middle age; there is only a small decline
thereafter to age 75.

16

[Table 2 here]
In the next section we therefore build in endogenous acquisition of financial literacy in a
way that traces patterns similar to those observed in the NFCS by age and education levels.

3

The Model

Our model of consumption over the life cycle allows uncertainty over asset returns, household income, and out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The consumer is assumed to choose
his consumption stream by maximizing expected discounted utility, where utility flows are
discounted by β. Decisions are made from time t = 0 (assumed to be age 25) to age T if
the consumer is still alive (T = 100).17 The consumer also faces stochastic mortality risk.
Adding to the heterogeneity created by the stochastic components, we also model the decisions of three different education groups (less than high school, high school, and college).
Across these education groups, we allow for heterogeneity in income as well as out-of-pocket
medical expenditure levels and capital market returns.
When making each per-period consumption decision yielding per-period benefit u(ct ),
the consumer may also elect to invest a portion of his resources in two different investment
technologies. The first is a basic technology (for example, a checking account) which yields
a certain (low) return r (R = 1 + r). The second is more sophisticated and enables the
This is consistent with Mandell (2008) who reports that high school students with higher literacy are
those from college educated families. Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto (2010) also show that financial literacy is
higher among younger (age 23-28) respondents whose parents had stocks and retirement saving when they
were teen-agers (12-17).
16
Since the NFCS is a cross-sectional survey, we cannot control for cohort effects. Nonetheless our data
are likely to generate flatter age profiles than cohort-specific ones. The increase at age 70 in the score for
high-school dropouts is likely due to small sample size in the NFCS for that group (less than 100 observations
per age-cell)
17
From life tables, there is a 2% chance of living beyond that age so we cap the computations at that age.
15
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consumer to receive higher returns, but it comes at a cost. Specifically, the consumer must
pay a direct cost (fee) to use the technology, cd . The rate of return of the sophisticated
technology is stochastic and the expectation of the return depends on the agent’s level of
e t+1 ). The stochastic return function is given by
financial literacy at the end of t, R(f

e t+1 ) = R + r(ft+1 ) + σε εt+1
R(f
where εt+1 is a N(0,1) iid shock and σε is the standard deviation of returns on the sophisticated technology. The function r(ft+1 ) is increasing in ft+1 and represents the equity
premium yielding higher returns on stocks. We denote by dt+1 = 1 the use of the sophisticated technology and dt = 0 the use of the basic technology.18
Financial literacy evolves according to

ft+1 = δ(t)ft + it
where δ is a depreciation factor and it is gross investment. Depreciation exists both because
consumer financial literacy may decay, and also because some becomes obsolete as new
financial products are developed. We let depreciation increase with age to reflect the general
finding of cognitive decline at older ages (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson, 2009).
Gross investment has a price of πi (it ), which includes both the monetary cost of advice and
also the opportunity cost of time spent obtaining literacy. That cost is convex, reflecting
decreasing returns in the production of literacy.19
Cash on hand is defined as
xt = at + yt − oopt
18
Our model assumes a binary decision and a constant share of assets invested in the technology, rather
than producing as an output the share of total assets invested in stocks. This simplication helps for computational reasons given we already are modeling an additional continuous decision, financial literacy investment.
Data on the latter are also notoriously difficult to match as prior authors have noted (Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout, 2005).
19
One could allow for a direct disutility of investing in financial literacy and try to estimate it from the
data. But because we are concerned mainly with the model’s properties rather than its precise fit to the
data, we abstract from the direct disutility channel.

9

where yt is net household income and oopt represents out-of-pocket medical expenditure.
Both of these variables are stochastic. End-of-period assets are given by

at+1 =




e
R(f

t+1 )(xt

− ct − π(it ) − cd ) if dt+1 = 1



R(xt − ct − π(it ))

if dt+1 = 0

We impose a borrowing constraint on the model such that assets at+1 have to be nonnegative. The consumer is guaranteed a minimum consumption floor of cmin (Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994). The sophisticated technology cannot be purchased if xt − cd <
cmin ; that is the government does not pay for costs of obtaining financial advice (in this
base case).
For an employed individual, the net household income process is given by a deterministic
component which depends on education, age, and an AR(1) stochastic process

yt = ge (t) + µt + νt
µt = ρe µt−1 + εt
εt ∼ N (0, σε2 ), vt ∼ N (0, σv2 )
where e represents an education group and ge (t) is an age polynomial (quadratic). Retirement is exogeneous at age 65. After retirement, we assume that the stochastic part of
income is fixed at the value as of the retirement date. We estimate the age profile of household net income in retirement as a ratio of pre-retirement income from the data using an
age polynomial (additional detail is provided below).
A similar stochastic AR(1) process is assumed for out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Because these expenditures are generally low prior to retirement (and to save on computation time), we allow only for risk in medical expenditures after retirement (as in Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994). Finally, we allow for mortality risk at all ages, drawing on the
2004 life-table and denoting pt as the one-year survival probability.

10

If we denote the non-deterministic components of income and out-of-pocket expenditures as ηy and ηo , respectively, then the state-space in period t is defined as st =
(ηy,t , ηo,t , e, ft , at ). The decisions are given by (ct , it , dt+1 ). We represent the problem as
a series of Bellman equations such that, at each age and for each technology choice, the
value function has the form
ˆ ˆ

ˆ

V (st+1 )dF (ηo )dF (ηy )dF (ε)
Vd (st ) = max u(ct ) + βpt
ct ,it
ε ηy ηo



e t+1 )(xt − ct − π(it ) − cd ) if dt+1 = 1
R(f
at+1 =


R(xt − ct − π(it ))
if dt+1 = 0
ft+1 =δ(t)ft + it
If technology can be accessed, the value function is given by V (st ) = max(V0 (st ), V1 (st )) .
The model is solved by backward recursion after discretizing the continuous statevariables. At each point in the state-space, we use a grid search to search for the optimal
solution of consumption and financial literacy investment. After we find an initial solution
on a coarse grid, we refine the grid around that point and repeat. At each point in the
state-space, we do this procedure for both technology choices before choosing which one is
optimal. We use 35 net asset points and 20 financial literacy points to create the statespace, and we use linear intrapolation to find the value function when net assets or financial
literacy stock at t + 1 falls off the grid. The value function behaves smoothly and relatively
linearly except at low levels of net assets, where liquidity constraints and the consumption
floor bind. Hence, the grid for assets in the state-space is defined as equally-spaced points
on a0.5 , which leads to more points at lower levels of net assets. We use the method proposed by Tauchen (1986) to discretize the processes for income and out-of-pocket median
expenditures (with 8 points each). In total, optimal decisions are computed more than six
million times.

11

4

Calibration

To implement the model, we assume that u(ct ) has a CRRA form with relative risk aversion
σ. To take account of household size, we follow Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006)
and define an equivalence scale which takes account of differences in household size by education group and changes in demographics over the lifecycle to affect consumption (following
Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber, 1999). Let z(j, k) = (j + 0.7k)0.75 where j is the
number of adults in household and k is the number of children (less than 18 years old). We
then define ne,t = z(je,t , ke,t )/z(2, 1) where je,t and ke,t are the average number of adults
and children in the household by age and education group. Equivalized household utility is
then defined as
ve,t (ct ) = ne,t u(

ct
)
ne,t

We use PSID data to estimate the time-series of average equivalence scales by education
group.20 We use a discount factor of 0.97 and a value of σ = 2.6. These are fairly standard
values used in the consumption literature: Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) use a discount factor of 0.97 and relative risk aversion of 3, and French (2005) estimates risk aversion
varying from 2.1 to 2.7 and a discount factor ranging from 0.98 to 0.99.
The minimum consumption floor is set at $10,000 per couple with one child.21 Computing
post-retirement income as a function of pre-retirement income is notoriously difficult because
retirement is in part endogeneous. Here we compute average net household income of retirees
and non-retirees by education and age group. Next, we compute the ratio of the average
retired household’s net income at age 65+ as a function of the average working household’s
net income as of age 64. This yields a retirement replacement rate at age 65 of around 75%
We compute the average number per household of adults and children (under 18 years old) by the head’s
education and age. We then compute the equivalence scale according to the formula above.
21
We arrive at this value using data from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evalution
(ASPE, 2008) ,where the maximum benefit payable to a couple with one child under TANF was $495 ($06).
The average monthly benefit of recipients on food stamps (for a 3-person household) was $283. Hence, prior
to age 65, the sum of TANF and food stamp benefits equalled $778 for a 3-person household or $9,336
annually (omitting the lifetime limit on TANF receipt). Data from the Social Security Administration
(http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2004.htm) shows that the maximum federal monthly
payment for SSI for a single household was $552 and $829 to a couple; adding food stamps to this amount
yields a value of $7620 to singles and $12,180 for couples.
20
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for high-school dropouts and high-school graduates, and of 64% for college graduates. These
are higher than replacement rates purely based on Social Security because households have
other sources of retirement income (spousal income, employer pension income, annuities,
etc). They are close to total retirement income estimates published elsewhere (c.f. Aon
Consulting, 2008).
The return on the safe asset is set to r =1% (net of inflation). We use an equity premium
of 4%22 for the rate on the sophisticated technology if someone has acquired maximum
financial literacy. We use data from the PSID to compute the share of wealth invested in
equity and IRAs, yielding a figure of 25% for high-school dropouts, 30% for high school
graduates, and 34% for college graduates. Since we do not model the intensive margin or
how much wealth is invested in the sophisticated technology, we use a value of 30% in what
follows (the average share among all those participating in stocks and IRAs). The maximum
premium when using the sophisticated technology is thus set to 0.015. With the power of
compound interest that additional return can imply up to 80% increase in wealth after
40 years (roughly the horizon for retirement if the consumer is initially 25 years old). To
facilitate interpretation, we set the maximum of financial literacy to 100 and its minimum
to 0. Hence, we let R(ft+1 ) = 0.015 × ft /100.

23

The standard deviation of the equity

premium is set to a value of 0.15, consistent with Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
Hence, since 0.30 of wealth may be invested in the sophisticated technology, the standard
deviation of the return for that technology is set to 0.06.
We estimate both income and out-of-pocket processes using the minimum distance
method from Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994). We first estimate by OLS the deterministic part of household income profiles using PSID data from 1980-99 and we then use
the residuals to estimate the AR(1) processes. The out-of-pocket medical expense process
is estimated using the same methodology.24 Following the literature (Hubbard, Skinner and
See Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
We chose a linear function for ease of interpretation. In part, this implies that financial literacy can be
rescaled to be interpreted in terms of returns which in principle could be observable and used to calibrate
the model. Data from Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) can be used to compute expected returns as a
function of education and age. Similar data from the U.S. are not available.
24
Estimates of covariance parameters are reported in Appendix 2.
22
23
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Zeldes, 1994; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006) we set the variance of the transitory
error component to zero in the simulations as it likely reflects measurement error.
Estimating the price of acquiring financial literacy from available data is difficult. If we
adopt a production function with decreasing returns, the cost of producing one unit depends
on the price of the inputs but also on total factor productivity which is unidentified unless
we can measure both inputs and outputs. We also seek to take into account the difficulty
of learning about financial products, which might be a result of low productivity of time
and money in producing financial literacy. In fact, financial services can be quite expensive.
For example, the cost of a one-hour consultation may cost up to $250.25 The productivity
of time and money could vary with education (which we will examine in future research).
For now, we avoid building other differences across education groups which would create
different investment and saving profiles. We use the simulated and actual distribution of
financial literacy from the NFCS to fit these parameters. We use the following cost formula
π(it ) = 75it1.75
which leads to a convex cost schedule. The first unit of investment is assumed to cost $75.
Depreciation in financial literacy is also difficult to calibrate from available sources.
We use the lifecycle path of financial literacy estimated from the NFCS to calibrate these
parameters. To reflect the fact that cognitive skills and memory are likely better at younger
ages than at older ones (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson, 2009), we assume a rate
of depreciation of 2.5% from age 25 to age 50 and let it decrease at a rate of 0.1% per year
after that age.
The cost of using the sophisticated technology is fixed at $1000. To provide a sense of
the magnitudes involved here, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates the distribution of fixed
See Turner and Muir (2011). As another example Veritat.com offers financial planning at $25 a month
for singles and $40 for families ($35 for retirees) plus an initial planning fee of $250. Accordingly the first-year
cost is $550 for singles and $730 for families. Less-expensive alternatives include financial advice software;
for instance the cost of a one-year license to use ESPlanner is $40 while the cost of ESPlanner extensive is
$149 (www.esplanner.com/product_catalog).
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costs for stock market participation in the PSID using a static portfolio model. Her median
estimate is $750 (in 2004 dollars). Of course, these estimates are derived from a simple twoperiod stock market participation model, while the model used here is richer. We choose
the value of $1000 to roughly match the fraction of sophisticated consumers at age 65.

4.1

Simulation

Upon finding the consumer’s optimal consumption, financial literacy investment, and technology choices at each point in the state-space and at each age, we use our decision rules to
simulate 2,500 individuals moving through their lifecycles. These consumers are given the
initial conditions for education, earnings, and assets that we have derived from the PSID
for persons age 25 to 30. We initialize financial literacy assuming a normal distribution
with a mean that depends on education level estimated from the NFCS; the index we use
is the fraction of correct answers (out of five financial literacy questions). We then draw
income shocks, out-of-pocket medical expenditure surprises, and rate of return shocks, and
we simulate the lifecycle paths of all consumers. Linear intrapolation is used when simulated
state-variables fall between gridpoints.

4.2

General Fit of the Basic Model

Figure 3 shows how moments from the simulated results compare to moments from the data
presented in Section 2. In the first panel, we see that our model captures differences in asset
accumulation by education group quite well. In particular, the model predicts the large
observed dispersion: at age 65, for instance, median net assets are $153,855 in the lowest
education group, while they are $395,864 for the college-educated. Thus the simulated
median college graduate has 2.6 times the net assets of a dropout, close to the observed
ratio of 2.7 in the data. Unlike Cagetti (2003), our model can do this without resorting
to differences in preferences (e.g. risk aversion and patience). The main mechanism in our
model is that there are differences in take-up patterns of the sophisticated technology and
hence differences in returns. In turn, these return and take-up differences are amplified
15

by differences in the accumulation of financial literacy. The simulated asset paths over
the lifecycle by education group are of interest, even if they do not exactly match what is
observed in the PSID. They do match around the time of retirement, though asset holdings
are somewhat low early in the lifecycle.
[Figure 3 here]
In the second panel of Figure 3, we show that initial differences in financial literacy are
maintained over the lifecycle. Despite depreciation in financial literacy, the model predicts
that consumers invest in financial literacy – not only to maintain but to increase their
financial literacy. As observed in the data, financial literacy peaks around the time of
retirement and declines slowly afterward. This is because investment in financial literacy
is not constant over the lifecycle: it tends to be positive early on and declines with age.
Eventually the force of depreciation, which rises with age due to cognitive decline, offsets
gross investment producing a tapering off of financial literacy in later years. Financial
literacy at age 65 is very well-matched, as can be seen from Table 3. Dropouts have an
average financial literacy score of 44.1 in the simulation ,compared to 46.9 in the data.
College graduates’ average financial literacy score is 80.6 in our model, compared to 80.1 in
the data.
[Table 3 here]
Drawing on the simulations, we compute the fraction of consumers that optimally and
endogenously acquires very little financial literacy. Table 3 shows the simulated proportion
of consumers with low literacy (scoring less than 25 out of 100) and the results confirm that
our model does a decent job tracking differences by educational levels. For example, the
model predicts that at age 65, 50.1% of dropouts have low literacy as compared to 7.6% for
college graduates. We also predict an increase in low literacy with age while the data show
a decrease. The last panel of Figure 3 reveals that the model does a good job in predicting
the large differences in the use of the sophisticated technology, although age profiles do not
match exactly. For example, we predict that at age 65, 39.6% of dropouts participate in
the sophisticated technology, compared to 80.4% among college graduates. Those figures
16

are respectively 21.4% and 73.7% in the data. We underpredict participation at younger
ages and over-predict at older ages; to fit participation at younger ages, we would need a
lower cost for using the technology. But then differences across education groups would
not be as well-replicated as they are now. Hence, if our objective were to provide the best
fit of the data, we could allow the cost of using the technology to depend negatively on
financial literacy. Instead, our goal is to understand the forces at play in a lifecycle model
that features financial literacy. Hence we avoid building in additional differences across
education groups that would make the mechanisms less transparent.

5

Policy Simulations

In this section, we investigate a number of scenarios that may alter literacy investment, technology participation, and net assets. First, we examine what would happen if all consumers
were completely financially literate. This allows us to posit a benchmark where there is no
welfare loss when a consumer acquires financial literacy. In other words, this mimics the
possibility that consumer investment in the sophisticated technology might be provided by
a free financial advisor who could offer exposure to the full equity premium.
Because government policy can affect consumers’ income profiles as well as their insurance against risk, we also consider three different policy simulations. Our next experiment
reduces retirement benefits for all groups by 25%: since we predict that reducing the benefit
replacement rate should boost the need to save, we are interested in the implications for
financial literacy investment. The subsequent experiment halves the consumption floor from
$10,000 to $5,000, thereby reducing protection the most for the least-educated consumers.
A final experiment increases income uncertainty, by increasing the standard deviation of the
permanent income shock by 25%.
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5.1

Full Literacy

To contrast a scenario where knowledge is imperfect and costly with one where there is
complete knowledge, we next assume that consumers start off with a financial literacy stock
of 100 and there is no depreciation. Since negative investment in financial literacy is ruled
out, this implies full literacy across the entire lifecycle. As a result of this change, a consumer
using the sophisticated technology earns the full equity premium. In Figure 4, we show the
results of such a simulation. We plot the simulated paths in this scenario (solid lines) and
the baseline scenario with imperfect literacy (dotted lines).
[Figure 4 here]
Compared to our previous results, it is not surprising that financial literacy for the
most-educated consumers changes little in this scenario. By contrast, important changes
are observed for both the dropouts and the high school graduates. As described in Table 4,
with full literacy, both groups save more and invest more in the sophisticated technology.
Median net retirement assets increase by $17,878 (4.5%) for the college-educated while they
rise by $27,505 (18%) among dropouts. The fraction of dropouts using the sophisticated
technology at the time of retirement goes up by more than 32.3 percentage points (from
39.6% to 71.9%). The large positive effects for the least-educated illustrate the tremendous
costs of imperfect financial literacy: knowledge allows individuals to invest in high return
assets and results in much higher wealth accumulation at the time of retirement.
[Table 4 here]
Wealth differences by education group also shrink substantially. In the baseline, the ratio
of median net assets between college graduates and dropouts was 2.6, while it shrinks to 2.28
with perfect knowledge, a 12% drop. Hence this simulation suggests that financial illiteracy
contributes to wealth inequality. Moreover, the results suggest that making financial literacy
less costly could have a relatively powerful impact on the wealth accumulation of the lesseducated.
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5.2

Lowering the Retirement Benefit Replacement Rate

As discussed in Section 4, the average retirement income replacement rate estimated in the
data is 75% for both dropouts and high school graduates, and 65% for college graduates. In
this next experiment, we examine the effect of reducing replacement rates by 25 percentage
points for all three groups, from the time of retirement until death. This experiment mimics
a change in policy where, for example, benefits are cut for all retirees. The retirement
system becomes less generous and individuals have to provide more for their own retirement
security.
Figure 5 shows the effects on assets and financial literacy. Because of the crowdout
effect that retirement benefits have on saving, we would expect assets to increase when the
replacement rate declines. A simple lifecycle model would predict perfect offset. But since
our model features liquidity constraints and uncertainty in income, the crowd-out effect
may be much less than complete. The results indicate that median net assets at the time
of retirement rise by 13% among dropouts, 17.6% among high school graduates, and 11%
among college graduates (see Table 4).
[Figure 5 here]
Since the need to save has increased, financial literacy also rises. Average financial
literacy increases by 6% for dropouts, 9% for high-school graduates and 4.7% for college
graduates. Accordingly, as described in Table 4, the share of those with little knowledge
declines across all education groups, i.e., it is not optimal to have low knowledge when
individuals are in charge of their own retirement saving. Thus, retirement benefits not only
crowd out private saving, but also financial literacy.

5.3

Lower Means-Tested Government Transfers

Several authors note that goverment transfers provide private saving disincentives by promising an effective minimum consumption floor (c.f. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994). This
is particularly true for dropouts, who face the highest probability of being at the consumption floor. For this reason, our next simulation reduces that consumption floor from $10,000
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to $5000 and results appear in Figure 6. As expected, saving by the least-educated respond
most to a reduction in consumption insurance. For dropouts, net median assets as of retirement jump by 21% (to $186,932 from $153,855). For high-school graduates the rise in net
assets is 10% while for college graduates, the increase is still substantial, at 6.7%.
[Figure 6 here]
Investment in financial literacy also increases in this scenario, particularly after age 45
when labor income drops and the likelihood of hitting the consumption floor increases.
Average financial knowledge at the time of retirement increases the most among high school
drop-outs, where financial literacy rises by about 10 percentage points. By contrast, financial
literacy of college-educated individuals increases by 4 percentage points. Evidently financial
literacy investment is akin to an insurance mechanism, used to boost saving via higher rates
of return. As a result of the increase in financial literacy, the fraction using the sophisticated
technology increases by 6 percentage points for dropouts.

5.4

Increasing Income Uncertainty

Because income uncertainty along with a liquidity constraint lead to precautionary saving,
our last simulation assesses how responsive financial literacy investment is to income uncertainty. In particular, we increase the standard deviation of the permanent and transitory
income shock by 25%; results are shown in Figure 7. Because income is riskier in this scenario, consumers of all education levels save more, particularly those least likely to benefit
from social insurance (i.e., those least likely to hit the consumption floor). The need to save
rises substantially, so as to self-insure against income shocks which are now more volatile.
By contrast with the previous scenario, the mostly highly-educated increase their saving
the most: median net assets increase by 8% (and only by 4% for dropouts.) As in other
models of precautionary saving, an increase in uncertainty does not generate high amounts
of wealth, particularly for those who are covered by social insurance (see Hubbard, Skinner
and Zeldes, 1994). The better-educated also invest more in financial literacy, in particular
during the second-half of the lifecycle. Although these changes are somewhat more modest
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than those found in the prior case, we can safely conclude that financial literacy can provide
important protection against income shocks.
[Figure 7 here]

6

Discussion and Conclusions

This paper offers an augmented stochastic lifecycle model that endogenizes the decision
to acquire financial literacy. Our approach acknowledges that financial literacy does offer
higher expected returns, but it is costly to acquire and depreciates with time. The optimal
financial literacy profile is shown to be hump-shaped over the lifecycle, and it also differs by
education group because of differences in lifecycle income paths. We also demonstrate that
allowing for endogeneous financial literacy creates large differences in wealth holdings and
that social insurance influences the incentives to acquire financial literacy.
We provide three contributions to existing models of saving and household wealth accumulation. First, the model generates wealth inequality above and beyond what traditional
models of saving normally deliver. Accordingly we can rationalize some of the large differences in wealth found in most empirical works on saving, by relying on an important fact:
individuals do not start their economic lives with full financial knowledge and that knowledge is acquired endogenously over the lifecycle. Second, some levels of financial ignorance
may actually be optimal. As demonstrated in many empirical papers, many individuals
display very little financial literacy. Our paper explains why some may rationally fail to
invest, since it is expensive to acquire financial knowledge and not everybody benefits from
greater financial sophistication. Third, financial literacy can be an important public policy
lever. For example, a policy initiative that reduced the cost of financial literacy – such as
providing financial education in school or setting up websites that made it easier to acquire
information – would have large effects on both wealth accumulation and wealth inequality.
According to our estimates, a substantial share of wealth can be attributed to being able
to utilize a sophisticated technology that allows individuals to invest in higher-return as-
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sets. Similarly, policy initiatives such as personal accounts under social insurance schemes
and increased reliance on individually-managed retirement accounts will be accompanied by
more financial knowledge as well as wealth inequality. Moreover, a rise in income risk, such
as that which characterizes the current macroeconomy, will be accompanied by an increase
not only in precautionary saving but also an increase in financial literacy.
While our paper is not the first to propose that financial literacy is a choice variable and
endogenously determined, it is the first to add financial literacy to an intertemporal stochastic model of saving. Thus Jappelli and Padula (2011) discuss investments in financial literacy
but they use a simple two-period model and do not track how differences in literacy levels
induce differential wealth outcomes. Delavande, Rohwedder, and Willis (2008) also posit
that investment in financial knowledge is akin to human capital investment, but their static
model cannot trace lifecycle wealth patterns. By contrast, our ability to dynamically model
investments in financial literacy in a rich intertemporal setting with decision-making under
many sources of uncertainty allows us to evaluate the quantitative importance of financial
literacy and to perform several important policy experiments. Moreover, our work can explain many of the findings reported in other papers. For example, our model is consistent
with results in Behrman et al. (2010), Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), and Van Rooij, Lusardi,
and Alessie (2011b), who document a positive empirical link between financial literacy and
wealth holdings even after controlling for endogeneity of financial literacy. Additionally our
analysis is consistent with Kimball and Shumway (2006), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula
(2010), Yoong (2011) and others who show that persons with higher levels of financial literacy are also more likely to participate in the stock market, which in our model is represented
by the use of the sophisticated technology.
Finally, our model can rationalize and account for at least some of the observed differences in wealth holdings across education groups. While other authors have had to rely on
social insurance and preference parameters to produce similar dispersion, our model shows
that endogenizing financial literacy can go a long way toward explaining wealth differences
over the lifecycle and across education groups. In a world where individuals are increasingly
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asked to take on responsibility to save and provide for their own retirements, and where consumers are confronted with complex financial markets, it is important to start incorporating
financial knowledge into our models of saving. People display different levels of financial
knowledge early in life, and this simple feature has important implications for how much
people save. By incorporating more realistic features in our theoretical models, we will be
better equipped to match the data, make predictions for the future, and generate better
recommendations for public policy.
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Appendix 1: List of Financial Literacy Questions from the National Financial
Capability State-by-State Survey (NFCS)

• Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year.
[After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the
money to grow? [1 More than $102; 2 Exactly $102; 3 Less than $102; 98 Don’t know;
99 Prefer not to say.]
• Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation
was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money
in this account? [1 More than today; 2 Exactly the same; 3 Less than today; 98 Don’t
know; 99 Prefer not to say]
• If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond prices? [1 They will rise; 2
They will fall; 3 They will stay the same; 4 There is no relationship between bond
prices and the interest rate; 98 Don’t know; 99 Prefer not to say]
• A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly payments than a 30-year mortgage, but the total interest paid over the life of the loan will be less. [1 True; 2 False;
98 Don’t know; 99 Prefer not to say]
• Buying a single company’s stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual
fund. [1 True; 2 False; 98 Don’t know ; 99 Prefer not to say]

28

Appendix 2: Estimates of Income and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditure
Process
Covariance Structure

< HS

HS

College+

Log Income Process
ρ

0.936

0.933

0.928

σε2

0.052

0.034

0.032

σv2

0.117

0.176

0.078

Log Out-of-Pocket Process
ρ

0.802

0.762

0.794

σε2

0.246

0.303

0.257

σv2

0.758

0.581

0.604

Table A1: Covariance Structure for Log Income and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures
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Figure 1: Lifecycle Net Household Income Profiles by Educational Attainment. This Figure
shows average net household income computed from the PSID waves 1980-1999 (see text).
The profile uses workers up to age 65 and retirees age 65+ to show how income drops at age
65. The Figure adjusts for cohort effects based on regressions with age controls.
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Figure 2: Median Lifecycle Net Assets by Educational Attainment. This Figure shows
median asset profiles by education group derived using the PSID (see text). The lines are
predicted from median regressions where a correction is made for cohort effects (following
French (2005)); assets include the sum of assets minus all debt.
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Figure 3: Net Assets, Financial Knowledge, and Percent Using Sophisticated Technology
by Educational Attainment: Comparison of Lifecycle Model Baseline Simulation and PSID
Data. Dotted lines represent the PSID data, while the solid lines represent simulated paths.
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Figure 4: Impact of Full Financial Literacy on Net Assets and Percent using Sophisticated
Technology by Educational Attainment Over the Lifecycle. The dotted lines represent the
baseline simulations in Figure 3, while the solid lines represent the full financial literacy
counterfactual. See also Table 4.
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Figure 5: Impact of Lowering the Replacement Rate by 25% on Net Assets and Percent Using
Sophisticated Technology by Educational Attainment over the Lifecycle. The dotted lines
represent the baseline scenario in Figure 3, while the solid lines represent the counterfactual
replacement rate reduction scenario. See also Table 4.
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Figure 6: Effect of Lowering Means-Tested Government Transfers on Net Assets and Percent Using Sophisticated Technology by Educational Attainment, over the Lifecycle. The
dotted lines represents the baseline scenario in Figure 3, while the solid lines represent the
counterfactual scenario of lowering transfers. See also Table 4.
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Figure 7: Effects of Increasing Income Uncertainty on Net Assets and Percent Using Sophisticated Technology by Educational Attainment, Over the Lifecycle. The dotted lines
represent the baseline scenario in Figure 3, while the solid lines represent the counterfactual
scenario with higher income uncertainty. See also Table 4.
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age group
25-35
35-45
45-55
55-65
Total

<High School
21.8
24.6
24.1
32.1
25.9

High School
24.8
39.8
42.3
53.3
38.5

College+
51.5
58.3
65.5
75.6
61.1

Total
38.6
48.7
53.4
59.5
49.1

Table 1: Lifecycle Participation (%) in Sophisticated Financial Products (Stocks and IRAs)
by Educational Attainment in the PSID
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age group
25-35
35-45
45-55
55-65
65-75

<High School
35.9
42.4
42.9
47.2
46.4

High School
53.3
58.6
62.7
64.8
62.7

College+
70.2
76.9
79.5
80.7
79.4

Table 2: Lifecycle Fraction (%) of Correct Answers to Financial Literacy Questions by
Educational Level, from the NFCS (see text).
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age
30
40
50
60
65

Median Net Worth
20,458 [6,609]
40,323 [28,063]
70,321 [59,164]
133,632 [99,095]
153,855 [116,066]

age
30
40
50
60
65

Median Net Worth
23,518 [20,722]
41,797 [54,363]
105,373 [100,256]
188,543 [159,387]
211,054 [190,302]

age
30
40
50
60
65

Median Net Worth
34,437 [32,923]
75,542 [108,056]
189,035 [188,804]
347,896 [278,018]
395,864 [317,186]

< High School
Mean Fin. Literacy % Fin. Literacy <25
34.6 [35.6]
36.9 [46.4]
36.9 [42.4]
36.3 [31.6]
42.9 [42.9]
39.5 [29.6]
45.3 [47,3]
45.2 [26.2]
44.1 [46.9]
50.1 [27.5]
High School
Mean Fin. Literacy % Fin. Literacy <25
51.0 [53.3]
15.1 [20.2]
51.7 [58.7]
15.8 [15.4]
57.1 [62.8]
18.5 [11.9]
58.4 [64.7]
27.7 [10.5]
56.7 [63.7]
34.6 [11.9]
College+
Mean Fin. Literacy % Fin. Literacy <25
67.7 [70.3]
3.5 [7.9]
70.7 [76.9]
2.6 [3.9]
77.3 [79.5]
2.5 [2.6]
80.9 [80.7]
4.7 [2.9]
80.6 [80.1]
7.6 [2.9]

% Sophisticated Tech
5.4 [19.5]
21.4 [21.4]
33.4 [25.5]
40.1 [29.9]
39.6 [21.4]
% Sophisticated Tech
6.5 [23.7]
26.7 [36.5]
43.8 [44.0]
51.8 [50.7]
51.7 [55.3]
% Sophisticated Tech
19.2 [50.2]
43.2 [57.9]
63.4 [66.0]
78.1 [72.5]
80.4 [73.7]

Table 3: Lifecycle Net Worth, Financial Literacy, and Usage of Sophisticated Financial
Technology by Educational Attainment: Simulated versus Actual Data [latter in brackets].
See text.
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As of Age 65
Median Assets
< HS
HS
College+
Avg. Fin. Literacy
<HS
HS
College+
% Fin. Literacy <25
< HS
HS
College+
% Soph. Tech.
less than HS
HS
College

Baseline

Full Fin. Lit.

↓ Repl. Rate

↓ Cons. Floor

↑ Income Uncert.

153,855
211,054
395,864

181,360
241,241
413,742

173,813
248,325
440,050

186,932
232,319
422,622

160,777
229,699
427,001

44.1
56.7
80.6

.
.
.

46.6
61.9
84.6

48.8
60.3
84.1

46.7
59.4
81.7

50.0
34.6
7.7

.
.
.

48.1
28.7
5.1

46.7
30.3
5.4

48.7
31.3
7.7

39.6
51.7
80.4

71.9
83.0
94.9

42.7
59.7
86.1

45.7
56.6
84.6

42.4
55.3
81.2

Table 4: Net Worth, Financial Literacy, and Usage of Sophisticated Financial Technology as
of Age 65 by Educational Attainment: Baseline and Four Experimental Scenarios. Baseline
scenario refers to Figure 3; Full Financial Literacy scenario refers to Figure 4; ↓ Replacement
Rate scenario refers to Figure 5; ↓ Consumption Floor scenario refers to Figure 6; and ↑
Income Uncertainty scenario refers to Figure 7. See text.
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